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Summary findings
The educational attainment of Brazil's labor force has  the authors argue, the marginal reduction in wage
gradually increased over the past two decades. At the  inequality that occurred in this period was linked
same time, the government has pursued a series of  primarily to a reduction in the returns to schooling and
economic structural adjustment policies. Blom, Holm-  only secondarily to a more equitable distribution of
Nielsen, and Verner investigate how these simultaneous  schooling.
advances have altered the relationship between labor  The findings suggest that the supply of highly skilled
market earnings and education.  labor is inadequate to meet demand. That suggests a
They find that the returns to education in the labor  need for policy action aimed at increasing access to and
market fundamentally changed between 1982 and 1998.  completion of tertiary education. Increasing the supply
While the returns to tertiary education increased sharply,  of highly skilled labor would improve prospects for both
the returns to primary education dropped by 26 percent  economic growth and reduced wage inequality.
and those to lower secondary by 35 percent. Moreover,
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In the last two decades, Brazil, along with many other developing countries, has
witnessed a major expansion in its education system. Simultaneously,  structural
economic reforms have swept the country's economy that now stands much more
liberalized internally and externally. This paper investigates  how the remuneration of
education has evolved during the period of these reforms.
The study  joins a strand of literature focusing on the changes of labor demand that have
taken place in a period of market liberalization and increased integration of developing
countries into the global economy. This strand of literature documents an increased
convexity of the earnings function. That is, the returns to one additional year of schooling
rises with the years of completed schooling. Or in other words, a skilled worker earns
increasingly more than an unskilled worker. 2
The empirical findings on increased rewards of skills are theoretically underpinned by
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Wood (2000). They argue that the economic reforms in
developing countries combined with lowered transportation and communication costs
could have given developing countries a comparative advantage in industries with an
increasing intensity in human capital, although still low intensity relative to developed
countries. The move of these industries to reforming developing countries have caused
the average input of human capital in production, in both developing and developed
countries to increase. Consequently,  both groups of countries have experienced an
increased demand for skilled workers. Findings from Costa Rica, Robbins and Gindling
(1999), and Columbia, Santamaria (2000), show that Latin American countries, indeed,
have experienced a shift in labor demand favoring highly skilled workers.
We solidly confirm the pattern of increased convexity in the earnings function in the case
of Brazil. We do so by estimating private returns to primary, lower secondary, upper
secondary and tertiary schooling separately. We estimate the returns from 1982 to 1998
using the Brazilian labor market survey. We apply both traditional Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and the quantile regression methodology.
The changed remuneration of education on the labor market is important, since it
indicates that highly skilled workers increasingly have become scarce in the Brazilian
labor market. A scarcity would impede domestic companies and administration in
acquiring the demanded advanced knowledge. The scarcity would therefore hamper
economic growth. If the market for education functions smoothly, the supply of education
would adapt to the shifts in demand. However, the market for education is in many
countries severely restricted, see Prichett (2000). The shifts in demand for education
might, therefore, not be accommodated by changes in supply, in which case there is need
for policy intervention. This paper examines the case of Brazil and seeks to answer three
questions: (a) Did the earnings function, in the Brazilian labor market, become
increasingly convex over the last two decades? (b) Do education policymakers in Brazil
2 See Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy, Riddle, and Romer (1998), Robbins and Gindling (1999),
Santamaria (2000), World Bank (1999), Lachler (1998), and Schady (2000) among others.
1need to react to the changes in the remuneration of education? And (c) What would be the
appropriate actions and the expected benefits?
The paper is organized as follows: the subsequent section describes the data. Section
three provides background information on the Brazilian education system. Section four
outlines the developments in the relations between education and earnings in Brazil for
the last two decades. Section five presents the regression methodology we used, and the
sixth section presents regression results and discusses policy implications.
The appendices are organized in five sections. Appendix A lists definitions of the
variables used in this paper; Appendix B gives summary statistics; Appendix C contains
the regression findings for both OLS and quantile regressions; Appendix D plots different
variables and presents graphs with quantile regression results. Finally, the strategies and
recommendations for Higher Education in Brazil from The World Bank's sector study of
higher education in Brazil is presented in Appendix E.
2.DATA
The study analyzes the monthly labor market data Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME)
from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), the Brazilian Statistical
Bureau 3. The average number of available observations is 230,000 per year 4. The large
number of observations implies that the statistical significance  of our findings largely
exceed conventional significance levels. Nevertheless, two limitations should be noted
when using this dataset. First, the data covers 6 metropolitan areas in Brazil: Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Salvador. These metropolitan
areas cover 31.9 million people in the economic active age out of an estimated 79 million
for Brazil in total. Moreover, in 1997, the states of the 6 surveyed metropolitan areas
produced 72 percent of the Brazilian GNP 5. Our findings are hence representative for the
large and modem parts of the Brazilian labor market, but do not necessarily carry over to
the rural economy. Second, being a labor market survey, the PME-survey only includes
income from the labor market, namely, salary, earnings of self-employed workers, non-
monetary earnings, and implicitly employer's earnings. These suffice for analysis of
wage determinants and wage inequality, but are insufficient for characterization of total
income inequality, since data does not report other important sources of income, such as
public transfers and income from capital.
3The PME-data has a rolling panel structure. Respondents enter in 4 consecutive months and, then, are out
of the sample for 8 months and, finally, surveyed for another consecutive 4 months. The panel structure
isn't used in this article. We estimate with a yearly frequency which implies that the same individual could
enter up till 4 times in the same regression. However, salary and potentially other characteristics change
from each observation.
4For 1998 only data up till July is included reducing the 1998 sample size to 108,000.
5Source:  JBGE accounts of gross regional products in current market prices. Brazilian GNP was R$
864,112  mil and the six states: Sao Paulo; Rio de Janeiro; Rio Grande do Sul; Minais Gerais; Pernambuco;
and; Bahia together accounted for R$ 618,728 mil.
2The main indicator for education is completed  years of schooling which is computed
using an algorithm based on three survey questions on education 6. For definition of other
variables see Appendix A. All reported schooling  variables are completed levels of
education. Hence, when completed grades of education are reported, dropouts are
counted as having completed the level of education below the level of drop out. For
example, the group of workers with completed  primary education includes dropouts of
lower secondary education.
3.BASICS OF THE BRAZILIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM
The Brazilian education system consists of four levels with graduation tests: primary,
lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary. The basics for the system are presented in
table 1. Noticeable is the relatively high average number of years it takes to graduate. It
takes 35 percent longer time to complete primary education than planned and 23 percent
longer for both lower secondary and upper secondary. This points to a low internal
efficiency that includes a severe problem with high repetition rates. Moreover, annual
cost per student increases significantly from upper secondary to tertiary education
suggesting even further inefficiencies at the latter level.
6 The algorithm follows the standard conversion used elsewhere, see Lam and Schonie (1993), Lam (1999),
and Barros and Ramos (1996).
3Table 1 Basic data of the Brazilian Education System
Brazilian  This paper's  Grade  Length  Average No. of  Estimated cost  Legal
structure  terminology  years to  in R$ per  responsibility
complete"  student  /year*  '_
Primary  1-4  4  5.4  517  Shared
Ensino  Education  between
Fundamental  Lower  5-8  4  4.9  637  Municipality
Secondary  and State
Education
Ensino mrdio  Upper  9-11  3  3.7  661  State
Secondary
Education
Superior  Tertiary  12-17  4-64  4.5  13,654  Federal'
Education  I  I_I_I
Source: Klein (1999) for the first three cycles and Paul and Wolff (1992) for tertiary education.
2'  Calculation of unit cost per student involves many uncertainties and assumptions. One should therefore
be very cautious when drawing conclusions based on unit costs. The above unit costs do not take into
account the high rates of dropping out or repetition. Adjusting for these problems would especially increase
unit cost for the lower levels of education. The cost for tertiary is calculated only for federal universities,
which normally are considered to be the most expensive. Source: World Bank (2000a) "Secondary
Education  in Brazil" and World Bank (2000b) "Brazil Higher Education Sector Study".
3*  Other providers than the legally responsible authority also provide education. For example, for lower and
upper secondary education, the actual providers are municipalities, states, federal government, and, private
institutions(l5%, 69%, 1%,  and 15 %). For tertiary education, the same partition is 4%, 13%, 22%, and
61%, respectively. Source: World Bank (2000a) and World Bank (2000b).
4 Minimal nominal length of a degree program is 4 years, but some degrees at federal universities take 5 or
6 years.
5 Tertiary education is regulated by a subcommittee within the federal "Conselho  Nacional de Educa9do"
(CNE).
4.DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS  ON EDUCATION  AND  EARNINGS
This section describes the educational composition of the Brazilian workforce and labor
market earnings from 1982 to 1998. Appendix C contains additional descriptive
statistics'.
4.1. Educational composition of the metropolitan Brazilian workforce
Undeniably, the stock of human capital has increased in Brazil over the last two decades.
In 1998, a worker had, on average, acquired 6.8 years of completed schooling. This
compares to 5.4 years in the begin of the 1980s. This 26 percent increase in school
attainment is the result of a steady  process where less educated workers retired while a
younger more schooled generation  entered into the labor market. However, by
international standards the Brazilian workforce still remains "under-educated" given its
per capita income, Birdsall and Sabot (1996).
7Barros and Ramos (1996) presents an analysis of education and earnings for the period 1976-1989. This
period overlaps with the period investigated in this paper, 1982-1998. For the overlapping years, 1982-
1989,  the figures  presented in this paper correspond with those computed by Barros and Ramos, despite
that their calculations are based on a different dataset, namely, the Brazilian national household survey,
PNAD.
4Figure 1 The educational composition of the workforce in 1982 and 1998
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The educational composition of the workforce in 1982 and 1998 is displayed in figure 1.
The spikes at 4, 8, 11, and 15-17 years of schooling correspond to the years with
graduation exams (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education,
respectively). Two shortcomings  of the education system are visible. First, in 1998, still
22 percent of the workforce is without any formal diploma of schooling, despite it
coming down from 34 percent in 1982.8  Second, a large proportion of workers dropped
out of school in-between two degrees, namely 37 percent in 1998 down from 41 percent
in 1982.
The accumulation process of human capital stock was strongest in the 1980s.  In the
1  990s, the pace slowed down. This trend holds for 4 out of 5 levels of education, the
exception being lower secondary education, table 2.
Table 2 The accumulation of schooling b  level for 1982-1990 and 1990-1998
% of workforce by level of  % change  % change  % change
schooling  from 1982 from 1990  from 1982
1982  1990  1998  to 1990  to 1998  to 1998
No degree  36.7  27.7  21.5  -24.8%  -22.1%  -41.4%
Pnm  32.7  34.2  34.3  4.6%  0.3%  4.9%
Lower sec  11.9  13.2  15.1  10.9%  14.4%  26.9%
Upper sec  11.2  15.5  18.8  38.4%  21.3%  67.9%
Tertiary  7.5  9.5  10.3  26.7%  8.4%  37.3%
Sum  100  100  100  - - -
Years of sch  5.4  6.2  6.8  14.8%  9.9%  26.2%
Source: authors' calculation based on PME-data.
In the 1980s, the percentage of workers with completedprimary education slowly
climbed up to 34.4 percent, but stagnated in the 1990s. This stagnation can be seen as a
8 This number is constructed as the sum of the first four bars of figure 1.
5consequence of two principal factors. First, a high drop out rate. Second, a substantial
increase in the enrollment rate into lower secondary education.
By far the largest expansion in completed schooling has taken place among the middle
levels of education. The group of workers with completed lower secondary education
increased by 27 percent and the share of workers with upper secondary education
expanded by a remarkable 68 percent.
For tertiary education, a decomposition into two periods is informative. In the 1980s, the
share of workers with completed tertiary education increased by 27 percent versus only 8
percent in the 1990s. This slowdown indicates a deceleration of enrollment and a
declining efficiency of the Brazilian tertiary education system during the nineties. This in
turn, partly explains the massive increase in the group of workers with completed upper
secondary education.
The increased number of graduates at the middle of the education scale resulted in a more
equal distribution of education in Brazil. The Gini coefficient for completed schooling
fell every single year in the observed period, starting from the zenith of 0.44 in 1982 and
ended 0.36 in 1998 9.
Figure 2 The school gender gap in 1982 and 1998 by education level
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Note: The gender gap is computed as the gender difference in percentage of workers who completed the
particular level of schooling divide by the male percentage, (%/omale-%female)/  %male. For years of
schooling: (YoS[male] - YoS[female] )/ YoS[male].
Source:  authors'  calculation  based  on PME-data.
The gender gap in education has been reduced over the two decades. In 1998,  the stock
of male workers had completed 13 percent more years of schooling than their female
colleagues. This figure compares to 20 percent in 1982. The data hence show that females
have acquired further schooling at a faster pace than their male counterparts over the last
two decades. Furthermore, the pattern of the gender gap in the education system has been
reversed. In 1982, the gender gap monotonically increased with the level of education. By
1998, the gender gap was most pronounced for lower levels of schooling, in particular for
lower secondary education.
9 Inequality of human capital in a population can be assessed by the same measures as income inequality,
such as Gini coefficient, Theil-L, Theil-T, and coefficient of variance. The Gini coefficient measure is
adopted as standard measure for inequality in both income and schooling through out this paper.
64.2. Evolution of earnings: 1982-1998
In 1998, an average metropolitan worker earned R$ 199 a week for an average work
week of 41.9 hours.  10  This implies an hourly wage of R$ 4.7. Education is a key
determinant of wage in Brazil, see table 3. The large difference between educational
groups is epitomized by the 814 percent difference between the monthly wage of a
university graduate and a worker with no degree.
Table 3 Earnings by education level in 1998
Completed  Medium hourly  Average hourly  Relative to the wage of
degree of  wage in 1998 (R$)  wage in 1998 (R$)  a worker with no
education  degree
No degree  1.47  1.94  100%
Primary  1.86  2.56  132%
Lower sec  2.55  3.60  186%
Upper sec  4.18  6.31  325%
Tertiary  12.2  15.8  814%
Total  2.48  4.84  249%
Source: authors' calculation based on PME-data
Earnings for the different education groups closely followed the same pattern during the
1980s, figure 3. The co-movement may be a result of the large role played by common
determinants of wages, such as macroeconomic  policy, macro economic shocks,
investment, and, productivity. Since the recovery from the recession in the early 1990s,
earnings by education level have diverged. Workers at the two ends of the education
scale, no completed degree and completed tertiary education, have experienced the
highest increase in salary. For these two groups, the current wage levels are more or less
equal to the levels obtained during the boom in 1986, but, remarkably,  it's  still lower than
earnings in 1982. For the group of semi-skilled workers (with completed lower and upper
secondary education) that expanded during the 1980s, the recovery in wages has only
been partial. This pattern suggests a link from relative supply of workers with a level of
education to the remuneration of that level of education. That is, the remuneration of
lower and upper secondary education fell because of an increase in the relative supply of
workers with these education levels. We shall return to this hypothesis below.
0  All  eanings  are  in fixed  1997  prices.
7Figure 3 Wage Index by education level (1982=100)
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Other factors than educational composition of the workforce influence the average wage,
such as, age, gender, labor market position, and, region of living. For example, in 1998,
the average age of a worker with no degree was 42.3 years old while the typical worker
with secondary education was 38 years old. Since age also affects wages, the age-
difference partially explains the observed wage difference. This stresses the need for
purging observed earnings for other effects in order to clarify the relationship between
education and earnings. This is done by regression methods as outlined in Section 5
Methodology.
Earnings inequality is notoriously high in Brazil. In 1998, the Gini coefficient was 0.56,
figure 4. The extremely unequal income distribution has sparked a number of studies of
the evolution and determinants of the inequality, see Neri and Camargo (1999), Ferreira
and Barros (1999), Lam (1999), and Birdsall and Sabot (1996). It is generally accepted
that wage inequality in 1998 was marginally below the level of 1982, as is also indicated
by the PME-data. However, for short run changes no clear consensus exist with the
notable exception of the launch of the Real plan in 1994 that clearly succeeded in
stabilizing prices which benefited the poor more than the rich. Hence the Real plan
reduced inequality  1 12.
I  IThis  finding corresponds with international  evidence from Dollar and Kraay (2000). Based on data from
80 countries, they find that elimination of hyper-inflation is a pro-poor policy.
12 Prior to the Real plan, the sign of change in wage inequality not only depends upon the chosen measure
of inequality,  but also upon the chosen income source, such as wage or total household income per capita.
Therefore no clear pattern is detectable.
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5.METHODOLOGY
This section is organized in two sub-sections. The first sub-section outlines the economic
model applied in the analysis and the second explains the applied estimation techniques.
5.1.Economic model
The underlying economic model used in the analysis will simply follow Mincer's (1974)
human capital earnings function extended to control for a number of other variables that
relate to location of living and labor market status. In particular, we apply a semi-
logarithmic framework that has the form:
In yi = (p(sj,  xi, z;) + ui  (1)
where In yi is the log of labor market earnings for an individual; i, si stands for completed
years of schooling, xi is a matrix of personal characteristics  other than schooling, namely,
age, age squared, gender, and, labor market status 13. zi represents a matrix of
metropolitan dummies. The last component, u;, is a random disturbance term that
captures unobserved characteristics.
The functional form is left unspecified in equation (1). We estimate returns to schooling
in two different ways. First, a linear specification of years of schooling:
In yi = Po + f3  si  + xi'pt3  + zi'fz + ui  (2)
Second, we estimate a spline form of years of schooling to estimate the average returns to
one additional year of schooling  regardless of the level of education
In yi =  Po  +  fpri  Spri +  f
3iosec Slosec +  1
3upsec Supsec +  1 3ter Ster  +  Xi'P  +  Zi'Iz  +  Ui  (3)
13  Labor market status is either employee, self-employed, or employer. Furthermore, employees are
partitioned  into  formal  employees  and informal  employees.  The split-up  of employees  is based  on whether
an employee  has  "carteira assinada" (signed workbook) which entitles the employee to a series of benefits.
The variables are dummies.
9Where each s refers to the number of years of schooling completed at the level of either
primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, or, tertiary education 14. Moreover, the
schooling variables in model (2) and (3) are interacted with a gender dummy in order to
estimate the returns to schooling for each gender separately15.
5.2.Estimation techniques
We estimate the above economic models using two different estimation techniques,
namely, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regressions. Normally, labor market
studies make use of conditional mean regression estimators, such as OLS. We use this
technique to obtain the general picture of the relationship  between education and
earnings. However, the OLS-technique is subject to criticism because of several, usually
heroic, assumptions underlying the approach. One is the assumption of homoskedasticity
in the distribution of the error terms. If the sample is not completely homogenous, this
approach, by forcing the parameters to be the same across the entire distribution of
individuals, may be too restrictive and may hide important information. Therefore, we
also apply quantile regression.
The advantage of quantile regressions is that one can choose any quantile and, thus,
obtain many different parameter estimates on the same variable depending on what part
of the wage distribution information is wanted. We estimate for each of the following
quantiles: 10th, 25'h, 50t, 75th, and, 90.  In this manner the entire conditional wage
distribution is explored. By testing whether coefficients for a given variable across
different quantiles are significantly different, one implicitly also tests for conditional
heteroskedasticity  across the wage distribution.
Intuitively, quantile regression estimates convey information on wage differentials arising
from non-observable characteristics among individuals otherwise observationally
equivalent. In other words, by using quantile regressions, we can determine if individuals
that rank in different positions in the conditional distribution (i.e., individuals that have
higher or lower wages than predicted by observable characteristics) receive different
premiums to education, experience, or to other relevant observable variables. This is in
particular interesting for countries such as Brazil where wage disparities are huge and
returns to, for example, human capital may vary across the distribution.
The method has many other virtues apart from being robust to heteroskedasticity. When
the error term is non-normal, for instance, quantile regression estimators may be more
efficient than least square estimators. Furthermore, since the quantile regression objective
function is a weighted sum of absolute deviations, one obtains a robust measure of
14 Specifically,  we estimate  the spline  function  with  knots  at the graduation  year of each  education  level,
hence  4, 8, and,  11  years  of completed  schooling.
15 We estimate  private  returns  to schooling.  Interpretation  of private  returns  to schooling  as an ordinary  rate
of return  to an investment  necessitates  inclusion  of a series  of additional  information,  such  as costs
(opportunity  cost,  private  out-of-the-pocket  costs,  and  public  costs),  the incidence  of repetition,  and
externalities  from  education.  We do not interpret  the computed  returns  to schooling  as an absolute
percentage return. We interpret the returns to schooling as an indicator for the interaction between existing
supply  of education and prevailing demand for education on the labor market.
10location and, as a consequence, the estimated coefficient vector is not sensitive to outlier
observations on the dependent variable.'1 6
Formally the method, first developed by Koenker and Basset (1978), can be formulated
a17 as 7
yi = xi'oo  + uoi  = Quanto(yi  f  xi) = xi'Ie  (2)
where Quanto(yi  I  xi) denotes the Oth conditional quantile of y given x, and i denotes an
index over all individuals, i = 1,...,n.
In general, the Oth sample quantile (0 < 0 < 1) of y solves
min  =Iy  {  I  ,  Y  - x'fl  I+  E (I-9)Iyi  - Ix;  }
p  = -n i  t,2x,;,  X  y,<X;,o  1  (3)
Buchinsky (1998) examines various estimators for the asymptotic covariance matrix and
concludes that the design matrix bootstrap  performs the best. In this paper, the standard
18 errors are obtained by bootstrapping using 20 repetitions
6.WAGE REGRESSION  FINDINGS
This section discusses findings and their implications for future education policy.
6.1.Returns to one additional year of schooling
Figure 5 presents the estimated returns to one additional year of completed schooling for
the 1982  to 1998 period. The estimates are statistically very significant, as indicated by
the narrow 95% confidence interval displayed by the two dotted lines19. Appendix C
16  That is, if  y  - >6  >  , o,  then  yi can be  increased toward +  oo, or if  yi - x:,  < o, yi can be
decreased toward  -o,  without altering the solution  ,B . In other words, it is not the magnitude of the
dependent variable that matters but on which side of the estimated hyperplane the observation is. This is
most  easily  seen by  considering the  first-order-condition, which  can  be  shown to be  given as  (see
Buchinsky  1998)  l  (  - + lsgn(  y,-xJ3 8 ))x;  =  0.
i=1
This can be  seen both as  a  strength and weakness of  the method. To  the extent that  a given  outlier
represents a feature of "the  true" distribution of the population,  one would prefer the  estimator to be
sensitive to such an outlier - at least to a certain degree.
17 See Buchinsky (1998).
18  The chosen  number of repetitions is fairly low compared to the standard of 200 in the literature. We have
limited the number of iterations due to time constraints. Because of the enormous dataset, each repetition
lasts one hour implying that an estimation for one year with the standard 200 iterations would take 200
hours. The choice of a relative few iterations has no impact on the estimated coefficient, only the standard
error is affected. The standard error may be underestimated. We ran a "control-regression" with 50
iterations.  The standard errors originating from the bootstrapping with 50 iterations only showed minor
deviations from the standard errors derived from the bootstrapping with 20 iterations.
19 The t-value for the coefficient of years of schooling  ranges from 248 to 445. The t-values decreases
during the period. This suggests that either the specified linear relationship between wage and schooling
11contains the complete estimation results from all regressions. Returns to schooling shown
in this section are for males which in 1998 constituted 74 percent of the labor force. The
returns to schooling for females largely follow the same pattern as for males.
In 1982, the returns to one additional year of schooling was 13.9 percent. The returns to
education fell steadily over from 1982 to 1998 reaching 12.8 percent. This corresponds to
an eight percent decline. The relative persistency of the estimated returns to schooling
indicates that pay-off to human capital is primarily driven by long-term structural
processes. The decline in returns to education can plausibly be explained by the equally
steady accumulation of human capital that took place during the last two decades, leading
to a larger increase in supply of skilled labor relative to the increase in demand.
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Note: The figure depicts the private returns to one additional year of schooling as
estimated by a linear specification of years of completed schooling. The model
includes control variables and is estimated by OLS. The dotted lines indicate the
95% confidence interval.
6.2.Returns to schooling by education level
We now split the above coefficient of years of schooling into four coefficients, one for
each level of education; primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary
education. This is done by estimating model (3) where years of schooling is specified
with splines. 20 The estimated coefficient for each level of education indicates the rate of
returns to one additional year of schooling at that particular level.
The returns to schooling by education levels for 1982 and 1998 are displayed in figure 6.
In 1982, primary  graduates  received the lowest  returns  to one additional  year of
education, namely 10.9 percent. This was slightly below the returns to lower secondary
education at 11.4 percent. The pay-off per year to upper secondary and tertiary education
becomes less appropriate or that schooling mattered less for wages in the later years. Subsequent findings
show that the linear specification became less appropriate.
20 The estimation  technique remains  OLS.
12were approximately five percentage points higher, namely, 16.7 and 16.2 percent,
respectively 21 .
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Source: authors' calculation based on PME-data.
Note: Each  bar  indicates  the private  retuns to one  additional  year  of
completed  schooling  at the designated  level.  The  model  includes  control
variables  and  is estimated  by OLS.
By 1998, returns to schooling by level of education  have moved in different directions.
Workers with lower levels of education experienced a substantial decrease in returs  to
education. Workers who only attended primary education,  between one and four years of
completed education received 8.1 percent, corresponding  to a 26 percent decline over the
period. Also, the returns to lower secondary schooling  plunged 35 percent reaching 7.1
percent in 1998, down from 11.4 percent in 1982. Workers holding a secondary education
diploma experienced only a slight fall in returs  from 16.7 percent to 15.5 percent, a
decline  of 8 percent from the  1982 level. As the only group, workers  with a completed
tertiary education, saw an increase in returns to schooling.  The returns rose from 16.1
percent in 1982 to 19.9 percent in 1998. This corresponds to a 24 percent increase.
Figure  7 shows the evolution  of returns to schooling by level of education  over the
period. The returs  are indexed  to 100 in 1982. Generally, the return to each level of
education changed slowly and persistently indicating that structural mechanisms caused
the evolution. The graph underscores that a clear divergence in retumns  to schooling took
place in the last two decades.
2  1The statistical  significance,  or in other  words  the reliability  of the estimate,  is once  again  very  high.  The
lowest  t-value  is 31.6  pertaining  to the coefficient  estimate  of primary  education  in 1998.
1  3Figure 7 Indexed  returns  by level of education  (1982=100)
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Source: authors' calculation based on PME-data.
Note:  The coefficients  are indexed  returns  to schooling  estimated  from  earnings-regression
with  control  variables.
This divergence  in returns  to schooling  by level of education  has caused  an increasingly
convex  curve of returns  to schooling  as shown in figure 6. Workers  with lower levels  of
education,  between  1 and  8 years of schooling,  which  already received  a wage
substantially  below  the wage of highly educated  workers, witnessed  the returns  to
schooling  fall. Conversely,  workers  with more than  12 years of schooling  positioned
higher in the wage distribution  saw an increase  in the returns  to schooling.  The increased
convexity corresponds  to findings by Arbache,  Green  and Dickerson  (2000) and Ferreira
and Barros (1999).
6.3.Returns  to schooling  within  education  levels
The above reported  returns  are estimated with the OLS-regression  technique  that assumes
individuals  in the same education  group receive  identical  returns to schooling. This is a
quite wide ranging  assumption  taking  into consideration  the size of each education  group.
For instance,  the group of workers  with primary  education  consists  of 10.9 mil. workers
(34.4 percent  of urban  workers).  The estimates  do not convey any information  whether
the above identified  changes  in returns  to education  have been conmmon  to all workers
within the education  group?  For example,  is the rising returns to tertiary  education
reserved relatively  few with extravagant  salaries  or is the increment  in pay-off  due to a
group-wide  wage increase?  The quantile regression  technique  provides  an answer to this
question.  With  quantile regressions,  we can assess whether  workers  across the whole
wage-distribution  in an education  group experienced  the same change in returns  to
schooling.  We estimate  returns  to schooling  for each of the following  quantiles:  10  , 25
50th, 75h, and 90'.  The coefficient  indicates how much a worker positioned  around the
estimated percentile  in the wage distribution  received  in returns for his or her schooling.
The full regression results  are presented  in Appendix  C. The returns to schooling  for each
education  level by quantile  are depicted- in figure 8.
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Note: The returns to schooling for the 9061  quantile is indicated by "+".
The graph depicts returns to schooling for one additional completed year of schooling for five quantiles.
The estimation  technique is quantile regressions.
The findings show that returns to schooling within education groups differ considerably
across the wage distribution. Whenever returns to schooling for different quantiles are
statistically  different, wage earners in the highest quantile receive the highest returns.
That is, whenever the difference is statistically significant, the returns to schooling for
workers in the 90th quantile consistently exceeds the returns to workers in the 7 5th
quantile  which in turn exceeds the returns for the 5 0th quantile and so on. The exception
being returns to tertiary education where returns for the wealthier quantiles, 7 5 th  and 9Oth,
were inferior to the less wealthier quantiles 22 23. The large dispersion indicates that
schooling is not uniformly rewarded in the labor market.
Figure 9 equally shows how the dispersion of returns to schooling  within each education
group has evolved over time. The graphs indicate that returns within the primary, lower
secondary and tertiary education groups became more homogeneous.  We computed the
relative spread of returns to schooling within each education group as the numeric
difference between returns to schooling for the 90th quantile and returns to schooling for
22 Other determinants  of wage have the opposite pattern across the wage distribution. For instance, being a
formal employee (having a signed workbook, "carteira assinada") or working in the construction sector
benefits more the poor workers (10th  quantile) than the richer (90'  quantile).
23 We tested the equality of coefficients across quantiles. For example, is returns to schooling for the 90&
quantile equal to the returns to schooling for the 75th  quantile? These tests are available from the authors
upon request.
15the 10 h quantile divided by returns to the 10th quantile, table 4. A drop implies that
returns to the less well-paid in the education group approached returns to the well-paid in
the education group. Hence, all quantiles in the education group experienced the same
direction of change
Table 4 Convergence or divergence in returns within educatin  groups
Absolute  Absolute  Change in  Relative  Relative  Change in
spread  spread  absolute  spread  spread  relative
1982  1998  spread  1982  1998  spread
Primary  4.1%  2.1%  -2.0 %point  48%  34%  -14 %/opoint
Lower sec  5.5%  2.8%  -2.7 %point  66%  47%  -19 %point
Upper sec  5.0%  8.3%  3.2 %point  35%  74%  39 %point
Tertiary  3.3%  0.8%  -2.5 %point  19%  4%  -15 %point
Source: authors' calculation based on PME-data.
Note: The absolute spread is calculated as the numeric difference in the estimated returns to schooling
for the 90"' and the 10" quantiles. The relative spread is the absolute spread divided by the estimated
retums to the lowest quantile (10  I).
For workers with primary, lower secondary, and tertiary schooling, returns to schooling
became more homogeneous. The relative spread was reduced by 14, 19 and 15
percentage points, respectively. The reduction in spreads shows that workers with the
same education level shared the evolution of returns to the schooling, regardless of their
income. That is, the decline in returns to primary and lower secondary education
estimated on the basis of mean earnings (by OLS-technique) equally pertains to workers
in the 10th quantile as for workers in the 90th quantile. Similarly,  we can conclude that the
rise in returns to tertiary education estimated by the OLS-techniques  has affected both the
relatively low-income workers with tertiary education as the high-income workers with
tertiary education.
For workers with upper secondary education, the returns to schooling across quantiles
diverged. All quantiles except the 90th quantile suffered deteriorating returns. Returns to
schooling for workers around the 90th  quantile increased slightly over the two decades. In
1998,  the 10 percent highest paid workers (9 0th  quantile) with secondary education
received 74 percent more than the 10 percent lowest paid workers (1  oth  quantile) in
returns to the same number of years of schooling. The decline in returns to schooling for
the group as a whole observed by the OLS-estimate, has consequently been shouldered
by the majority of the workers in the group. However, a subgroup has continued to enjoy
elevated returns to schooling.
It's a puzzle why the reward to upper secondary schooling became increasingly uneven,
when the other three education levels became more homogeneously rewarded. Equally
surprising is the large spread existing within the pre-tertiary education groups, 34, 47 and
74 percent for primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary education, respectively.
The large dispersion in returns to schooling suggests that: First, factors not controlled for
in the model, are linked to the returns to schooling; and/or second, the estimated model
should allow for interaction between returns to schooling and observable characteristics,
16such as experience,  job-status, industry of employment and region of living. 24 Three
uncontrolled factors have been asserted that could explain the large spread.
*  Quality of schooling. Students that attended high-quality schools, accumulated human
capital at a faster pace than students enrolled in low-quality schools. The human
capital difference subsequently implies a wage-difference in the labor market.
Behrman, Birdsall, and Kapland (1996) find a substantial effe,ct  from quality of
schooling to returns to schooling in Brazil.
*  Social Capital. If the benefit of "knowing somebody" rises with the years of
schooling, then retums to schooling depend on each individual's amount of social
capital 25.
*  Unobserved ability. Unobserved ability increases knowledge acquired in school.
Consequently, "high" ability leamers pick up more in school and, therefore, obtain
higher retums to time spent in school than "low ability" leamers 26.
We do not try to assess the relevance of each factor in the explanation of our findings.
For now, we settle with the important information  that the change in returns to schooling
for each education group identified by the OLS-estimations has affected the vast majority
of workers within each education group. The increased convexity in returns to schooling
is hence a general phenomenon in the Brazilian economy.
6.4.Impact of other personal characteristics on wage.
The estimated regression model contains several other personal characteristics than
education. Below we briefly comment on the impact of personal characteristics  other than
education on wage.27
24 Robbins and Minowa (1996) examine the impact of industry of employment on returns to schooling in
Brazil. They argue from an efficiency-wage perspective. The cost of monitoring an employee's effort
depends on the sector's production technology. Returns to schooling therefore differ across industries. In
accordance with theory, they fnd  large differences in returns to schooling  between industries. Card and
Lemieux (2000) find that returns to the same level of schooling may vary between age-cohorts, since
younger graduates are imperfect substitutes for older graduates due to lack of experience. Similarly, returns
to schooling couJd  differ across metropolitan regions.
25 Social capital has been defined in many ways. Social capital is here thought of as an individual asset
characterized by (a) the number of persons that you know and (b) the extent to which they will put you "in
front of the rest".
26 Rosenbaum (2000) discusses the role of unobserved ability in the increased college/high school wage
differential in USA.  As a proxy for unobserved ability, he uses cohort specific educational ranking,
assuming (a) a positive relationship between education and unobserved ability and (b) that relative
unobserved ability remained stable over the period investigated (1940-1996). The idea is that due to the
education expansion over time, the unobserved ability of an average high school graduate has fallen. In
1940,  high school graduates were between the 68% and 86% best educated in the population. By 1996,  they
were among the 9th and 43rd percentile. The relative ability of a high school graduate had hence decreased
which partially explains the observed relative decrease in earnings of high school graduates. A vast amount
of literature investigates  the relationships between ability, choice of education and returns to education. For
a review see Card(2000).
17*:  Experience. The returns to experience has steadily declined over the two decades.
Two possible explanations exist for this decline: (i) the aging of the labor force; in
1982, the average worker was 43.2 years old. This compares to 46.6 years in 1998.
The aging of the labor force implied that the supply of experienced workers increased
which in turn reduced the returns. (ii) The value of experience declined due to the
introduction of new products and production techniques.
*:  Female wage-gap. The participation of females in the labor market rose considerably
during the two last decades. In 1998, women made up 26 percent of the labor force,
which compares to 19 percent in 1982.  Concurrently, the wage gap associated with
being a female approximately halved over the period. Nevertheless, the wage
difference between male and female workers, keeping other observable factors
constant, still remains substantial. The wage gap amounts to 1.3 reais per hour which
is 28 percent of the average hourly wage.
*  Job-status. The economic reforms of the 1980s and 1  990s seem to have benefited the
employers and self-employed relatively more than employees. The wage-premium
given to employers and self-employed  relative to informal employees grew R$ 0.5
and R$ 0. 1, respectively. The wage-premium  for employees linked to a formal wage-
contract, "cartiera assinada", has marginally declined over the period. The increased
wage premium to self-employed and the reduction in wage-premium to formal
employees could be one of the reasons for the gradual increase in informality that
took place during the two examined decades. In 1982, the share of informal workers,
defined as self-employed and employees without a signed workbook, made up 34
percent of the workforce compared to 47 percent in 1998. In particular the share of
self-employed  workers rose. Additional, we find that having a signed workbook is
especially beneficial for low-income employees, 1 Ih and 25th  quantile, where the
wage premium per hour attains R$ 1.2. The wage-differences  between job-status
depend to a high degree upon the economic cycle. Compared to employees without a
signed workbook, the wage premium for employers and self-employed are pro-
cyclical while the premium attached to a signed workbook moves counter-cyclical. In
non-technical  terms, these findings show that employers and self-employed suffer
relatively more in economic recessions while workers with a signed workbook are
cushioned.  Hence, the increase in informal jobs could has lead to a rise wage
volatility.
*:  Wage premium between sectors. During the two examined decades, the hourly wage-
premium to workers employed in the service sector increased by R$ 1.1 compared to
the reference group of workers employed in commerce. Concurrently, the wage
premium to workers in manufacturing declined 15 percent corresponding to R$ 1. In
particular during the trade-liberalization from 1988 to 1990 did the well-off
manufacturing workers, the 75th and 90th quantiles, suffer a drastic drop in wage-
premiums, 42 and 45 percent, respectively. These shifts in wage-premiums were
accompanied by a flow of labor from manufacturing to services. The share of
27 Descriptive statistics cited in this paragraph are from Appendix B. The impact of a personal
characteristics  on hourly  wage  is calculated  as the exponential  value  of the estimated  coefficient  depicted  in
Appendix D.
18employees in manufacturing decreased from 24 percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 1998,
whereas the share of employees in services swelled from 40 percent to 49 percent in
the same period. Furthermore, the quantile regression findings reveal that
employment in the construction sector is lucrative for workers in the upper end of the
wage-distribution,  7 5 th  and 90th  quantiles, whereas for workers in the 10th  and 25th
quantiles, the wage premium is consistently negative.
*  Metropolitan areas. From 1982 to 1994,  the wage-level in all covered metropolitan
areas decreased compared to the wage level prevailing in Sao Paulo. Since then, there
has been a partial recovery, especially in Recife, Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro.
Although we believe these findings merit additional attention, this cannot be given in this
paper due to its focus on education. We therefore return to the main agenda.
6.5.Reasons behind the change in returns to schooling
The findings of a fundamentally different relationship between wages and education
naturally leads to the question of what are the forces causing the increased convexity of
returns to schooling. This section discusses plausible answers.
First,fluctuation in GDP seems to impact the average returns to schooling, figure 9. A
relationship is, indeed, discernible,  but only after 1986. The simple correlation coefficient
between the two series is -0.01 for the whole period 1982-1998, but 0.46 for the period
after 1986.  After 1986, GDP-growth, thus, seems to be weakly related to the average
returns to schooling in the subsequent year. That is, GDP-growth, all other factors equal,
increases the reward to human capital.
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GDP growth or factors associated with GDP-growth could affect returns to schooling by
various channels. In a standard neo-classical production function with factor neutral
technology and three factor inputs: capital, raw labor and human capital, the marginal
product of human capital depends positively upon the other two inputs. Consequently,  the
marginal value of schooling increases with capital investments, the availability of raw
19labor and the technological level. Hence, increased capital investments and increases in
total factory productivity linked to economic growth plausibly explains the positive
relationship between economic  growth and returns to schooling depicted in figure 9.
However, the volatile movements in GDP cannot explain the increased convexity in
returns to schooling. The steadily growing difference between returns to lower levels of
education and returns to tertiary education fits poorly with the volatile movements in
economic growth. Therefore, we turn to other mechanisms for an explanation. Previous
research has explained movements in the skill premium by five structural mechanisms.
Below the essence of each hypothesis and the relevance in the Brazilian case are
discussed.
Institutional change in the labor market. This explanation asserts that deregulation of
the labor market, such as diminished labor union power, reduced real minimum
wages, or expansion of the informal sector, have affected returns to schooling. 28 As
presented in the previous subsection, a significant expansion of the informal sector
has taken place during the two decades. 29
The remaining four hypotheses are best illustrated in a supply and demand framework for
skilled versus unskilled labor.
*  Shifts in labor supply. Assuming labor, skilled as well as unskilled, is a normal good,
an increase in supply of one of the types of labor, would, all other things equal, cause
the price, which in this case is the returns to education, to fall. As presented above,
several shifts in supply have taken place during 1980s and 1990s. The group of semi-
skilled workers (workers with lower and upper secondary education) rapidly
expanded (by 27 and 67 percent, respectively).
*  New technology has sharpened demand for skilled labor. Since, new technology is
primarily accessible by workers with higher education, the demand for skills rises as
new technology is introduced in the economy.
*  Increased openness has increased demand for skilled labor. Reductions in tariffs and
elimination of most non-tariff barriers supposedly have altered the national (autarchy)
price on skills to the world market price. On the world market, high returns to tertiary
schooling  prevails because of scarcity of skilled labor in the world 30. In the case of
Brazil, the increase in skill-premium due to a change from autarchy prices to national
prices is unsatisfying. The argument hinges on national endowments of skilled labor
28 The minimum  wage  is expected  to affect  returns  to schooling  negatively.  A rise in a binding  minimum
wage  increases  the wage  of the lowest  paid workers  who are mainly  without  or have  little education.  For
workers  with  higher  levels  of education  for whom  the minimum  wage  is not binding,  the salary  will not be
affected  by a rise  in minimum  wage.  Consequently,  the returns  to the first  years  of schooling  will decline.
The  decline  in returns  to schooling  would  be mitigated  if wage  contacts  above  the minimum  wage  were
nominated  in multitudes  of the minimum  wage.
29  For the increased  informality  to have  caused  the observed  changes  in returns  to schooling,  the returns  to
schooling  should  differ  between  formal  and informal  returns.  Preliminary  estimates,  not shown  here,  but
available  from  the authors  on request,  suggest  that  this is not the case.
30 Sachs  and Shatz  (1996)  discuss  the theoretical  foundations  for  the openness-explanation.
20exceeding  the world market's endowment which is rarely the case for developing
countries.  Nevertheless, increased openness could still have impacted the returns to
education, if the increased openness implied a significant transfer of new technology
that in turn altered returns to schooling.
*  Change in the relative size of sectors in the economy. If sectors with relative high
demand for skilled workers have expanded, then total demand for high skills would
increase. See Katz and Murphy (1992).
These explanations  might very well be interrelated,  as hinted above. For example,
increased openness could have spurred domestic companies to update production lines
(new technology) or/and caused a change in the size of certain sectors.
From the evidence shown this far, it is plausible that multiple factors are at play. The
supply-explanation  could account for the falling returns to primary, lower secondary and
upper secondary education. However, other factors than increased supply of tertiary
graduates must have impacted. Otherwise, the returns to tertiary education would have
declined which is not the observed trend. Consequently, one or multiple of the remaining
four factors must have build up demand for tertiary educated workers. This explanation is
in line with findings for other countries, see for example Murphy, Riddle and Romer
(1998).
6.6.The impact of education on wage inequality
Education is a key determinant of wage. The importance of education for wages can be
measured by the fraction of variation in wages that education explains. In Brazil,
education accounts for around 40 percent of variation in labor market income. 3"  In 1982,
schooling explained 42 percent of variation in earnings, which marginally exceeds the
level in 1998; 39 percent. This puts education as the single most important determinant of
labor market earnings and, thus, for inequality of earnings.
The impact of education on wage inequality is a combination of (1) the distribution of
education in the workforce and (2) the remuneration of education in the labor market. 32
To assess the impact of these two effects we take first take a graphic approach.
31 This  is the R2 of a estimation  with  only  schooling  variables  as regressors.  It is hence  the gross
explanatory  power  of education.  The explanatory  power  cannot  completely  be attributed  to the causal  effect
of schooling  on income  due to co-variation  with  both  observed  factors,  such  as region,  and  unobserved
factors,  such  as ability.
32 Education  indirectly  affects  income  inequality  by other  channels  than labor  market  earnings.  For
example,  more  education  often  leads  to improved  health  that  in turn increases  income  and  decreases  wage-
inequality.  Additionally,  education  has dynamic  effects  on future  income  inequality,  for  example  by
reducing  the size of households.
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The link between the distribution of schooling and the distribution of wages appears
weak at least in the short run, figure 10. In the long run, the substantial decrease in
schooling inequality equally failed to translate into a visible decrease in wage inequality.
However, other factors than the distribution of schooling affect wage-inequality, a causal
relationship between wage inequality and schooling inequality could hence fail to be
visible if another determinant of wage-inequality simultaneously  had offset the impact.
Figure 11 Wage inequality and returns to schooling
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Conversely, the link between returns to schooling  and wage-inequality appears strong,
figure 11.33  We read these findings as suggestive evidence that it is primarily the returns
to schooling  that matters for wage-inequality and only secondarily the distribution of
schooling.
For a parametric assessment on the roles that returns to schooling and the distribution of
schooling played in wage-inequality, we rely on analysis done by Ferreira and Barros
33  Both the wage-inequality and the returns to schooling are calculated from the same data set, PME.
Measurement error in wages could hence intensify the relation between inequality and returns. To evaluate
the seriousness  of the measurement error, we compared the estimated returns to schooling with inequality
measures based on the national household survey, PNAD. The co-movement between the two series
weakened, but remained salient. However, the weakening is not necessarily a sign of serious measurement
error, it could indicate  that wage inequality has developed differently in rural areas not surveyed by the
PME-data, but covered  by the PNAD data.
22(1999). They analyze changes in the distribution of income from 1981-1996 by using the
technique of micro-simulations and the national household survey, PNAD.34 The change
over the last two decades in the role of education in wage inequality is decomposed into
two effects, a composition effect (change in the distribution of schooling) and a price
effect (the change in rate of returns to schooling).
Ferreira and Barros find that the change in returns to schooling, the price effect, slightly
improved wage-inequality. The Gini coefficient decreased from 0.561 to 0.554 due to the
change in returns to schooling. This effect is an outcome of two impacts: first, the fall in
average returns to schooling decreased wage inequality. Second, the increased convexity
in returns to schooling worsened wage-inequality. The overall decrease shows that the
impact from the average fall in returns dominated the impact from the increased
convexity.
The increase in attained schooling, the composition effect, exacerbated wage equality. All
other factors equal, the increase in completed years of schooling caused the coefficient to
increase from 0.561in 1981 to 0.582 in 1998. 5
These findings underscore the need for focus on returns to schooling for equity and not
only focus on the distribution of schooling. In Brazil, the fall in returns to schooling
actually proved to be the equalizing factor for wage-inequality over the last two decades.
The importance of the rate of returns to schooling for wage inequality in Brazil is also
emphasized by research done by Lam (1999). Lam analyzes what would happen to wage
inequality in Brazil if the distribution of schooling in the Brazilian labor force was
identical to that of South Africa. The level of human capital differs significantly in the
two countries. South Africa succeeded early in providing universal primary education and
broad coverage of secondary education, which Brazil only recently achieved.
Consequently,  the average South African worker has substantially more schooling, and
the distribution of schooling is considerably more equitable compared to that of Brazil.
However, the relative share of Brazilians with tertiary education is larger than that of
South Africa, 7.5 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively. 36 Surprisingly, Lam finds that the
level of wage inequality in Brazil practically would remain constant at the current
34The  goal  of micro-simulations  is to identify  reasons  for differences  in wage  structure  over  time  or
between  countries.  For comparison  across  time, a mincerian  wage  regression  is estimated  at the start  of the
examined  period  and at the end.  Subsequently,  the change  in pay  structure  is broken  into  two impacts.  First,
the effect  of change  in personal  characteristics,  the composition  effect,  such  as accumulation  of education
or experience.  This  effect  is observed  by simulating  the wage  structure  if the returns  to personal
characteristics  remained  constant  while  the personal  characteristics  changed.  Similarly,  the impact  of
changed  returns  to personal  characteristics,  the price effect,  is observed  by simulating  the wage-structure
arising  from  changed  returns  but constant  personal  characteristics.
35 Notably,  the expansion  in primary  and secondary  education  scale  has a tremendous  say in eradication  of
poverty,  not only  through  higher  labor  market  earnings,  but also  through  other  channels  such as decreased
fertility.
36 In 1995,  the Brazilian population, rural and urban, had on average completed 5.6 years of schooling
which compares to 7.9 in South Africa. The coefficient of variation for completed schooling, an inequality-
measure, was 0.77 in Brazil and 0.53 in South Africa. The figures are based upon two nation-wide
households data sets, PNAD for Brazil and October Household Survey for South Africa.
23notorious high level. This finding shows that even if the Brazilian labor force was to
attain the same high and equal distribution of schooling  as that of South Africa, which at
the current speed of educational attainment would take more than 20 years, the level of
income inequality would more or less remain the same. 37
We interpret the presented findings as piecewise evidence that the returns to schooling is
the primary link from education to wage inequality. The impact of a more equitable
distribution of schooling only influences wage inequality through the supply impact on
returns to schooling. In this regard, the increased convexity arisen from the surge in
returns to tertiary education inhibits substantial reductions in wage-inequality. The
findings suggest that as long as the returns to schooling rises sharply with years of
completed schooling, a sizable improvement in wage inequality will not take place.
6.7. Policy implication for education policy
The high demand for tertiary educated labor in Brazil strongly indicates that the available
human resources inadequately meet demand. Although the increased demand for skilled
labor has had an undesirable impact on wage inequality, curbing the rise in demand for
skilled labor would be an inappropriate and detrimental way to address the issue of wage
inequality. Trying to restrain the increased demand for skilled labor by reversing previous
reforms on openness or deregulation of the labor market could have grave economic
consequences. Moreover, a reversal would not necessarily lead to a decrease in returns to
tertiary schooling, in particular, if the skill-premium has arisen due to newly available
technology.
The strong demand for highly skilled labor originates ultimately from a willingness to
pay by the private and public sector. This willingness to pay signals that highly skilled
workers can be put into productive positions. It presents Brazilian policymakers with an
opportunity for economic growth that can be realized by increasing the output of
graduates from the tertiary education system. The increased number of graduates would
receive a substantial higher wage compared to the alternative wage of a secondary
graduate. Furthermore, domestic companies would be able to hire an increased number of
highly skilled workers capable of tapping into the developed world's technology. Skills
that are critical for technological transfer and for a knowledge-based production.  38
Policymakers in countries like Brazil have hence a keen interest in assuring available and
affordable skilled labor in order to speed up the technological catch-up with developed
countries. The past two decades of expansion in primary and secondary education has
given policymakers the option to increase the supply of highly skilled workers that
previously did not exist. This study shows that this option is exceptionally valuable.
Expanding the relative share of graduates with tertiary education is a way to capitalize
37The  Brazilian  labor  force  acquired  approximately  one  additional  year  of completed  schooling  per decade
from  1960-1998.  Source:  Authors  own  calculations  and  Birdsall  and  Sabot  (1996).  At  this  speed,  it would
approximately  take  Brazil  23  years  to reach  the  current  level  of schooling  in South  Africa.
38Caselli  and  Coleman  II (2001)  and  Lee  (2001)  examine  empirically  the  determinants  of  computer-
technology  adoption.  Both  studies  find  strong  evidence  that  human  capital  intensive  countries  have  adopted
the  digital  technology  faster.  Furthermore,  Caselli  and  Coleman  document  that  the  share  of  population  with
higher  education,  in particular,  matters  for  embracing  of  the  new  technology.
24upon this option and thereby increase the external efficiency of the whole education
system.
An increased in supply of skilled workers would equally affect wage inequality. The
effect is a combination of two effects previously discussed:
*  The direct composition effect. The composition effect is the impact on wage
inequality following from the increased share of workers with tertiary education,
assuming the returns to schooling remains constant. Since tertiary educated
workers predominately receive a salary above the average, increasing the share of
tertiary educated workers tends to exacerbate wage inequality.
*  The indirect  price effect. Increasing the supply of workers with tertiary education
drives down returns to tertiary education. The price effect hence promotes equity.
The size of the effect depends critically upon the sensitive of returns to schooling
to changes in supply. 39
The combined effect of an increased supply of skilled workers is hence ambiguous.  In the
short run the composition effect may dominate the price effect. In that case, policymakers
face an efficiency-equity dilemma: An education  policy that pursues higher efficiency
and economic growth simultaneously compromises equity. Nevertheless, in the long run,
increasing the supply of tertiary educated workers appears to be the only growth-
promoting way to reduce wage inequality arising from differences in educational
endowment. As Lam (1999) shows, reducing the inequality of the distribution of
schooling in Brazil only modestly decreases wage inequality. The high rate of returns to
schooling, notably the returns to tertiary schooling, plays a key role. Therefore, a
reduction in the returns to tertiary education has to take place before wage inequality due
to education differences is significantly reduced. 40
According to our analysis, increasing supply of workers with tertiary education
constitutes a visionary long-term policy that promotes economic growth and reduces
wage-inequality. The policy would be (a) an appropriate response to the change in
demand for schooling  and (b) a logical consequence of the past two decades of expansion
in primary and secondary education.41
39 Increasing  the  enrolment  into  tertiary  education  would  simultaneously  decrease  the  supply  of  workers
with  upper  secondary  education.  Consequently,  the  returns  to upper  secondary  education  would  pick  up and
thereby  raise  the  salary  of  workers  with  upper  secondary  education.
40 The  South  Korean  education  policy  is an  example  where  a major  education  expansion  at  all  levels  of
education  succeeded  in satisfying  both  the  equity  goal  and  the  efficiency  goal.  Park,  Ross  and  Sabor(1996)
compare  the  impact  of changes  in educational  composition  of  the  workforce  on  the  inequality  of  pay  in
Brazil  and  in South  Korea  from  1976  to 1985.  For  South  Korea,  they  find  that  a surge  in secondary  and
tertiary  education  attainment  kept  returns  to schooling  from  rising  and  thereby  prevented  a deterioration  in
wage  inequality.  In  other  words,  the  egalitarian  price-effect  dominated  the  inequality  generating
composition  effect.  Hence,  the  expansion  of  tertiary  education  proved  both  growth-generating  and
egalitarian.
41 The  policy  considerations  presented  in this  section  extents  beyond  the  case  of Brazil  to the  degree  that
education  policy  and  labor  demand  in other  countries  have  followed  a path  similar  to that  of Brazil.  Studies
previously  cited  in  this  paper  document  that  a rise  in returns  to skills  has  taken  place  in a series  of both
25In a smoothly  functioning market for education, high returns to tertiary education would
only arise temporarily. High returns to tertiary education would induce secondary
graduates to attain tertiary education. Thereby, the supply of workers with tertiary
education would increase putting a downward  pressure on returns to tertiary education.
However, the market for education may work imperfectly. Market failures, such as
limited available places at learning institutions and credit constraints, are likely to inhibit
potential students in entering tertiary education. This appears to be the case for the
Brazilian market for education. The rise in returns to tertiary schooling over the last two
decades has not induced an acceleration of the relative share of workers with tertiary
education. Actually, the pace of increase in tertiary graduates decelerated in the 1  990s
despite surging returns to tertiary education. The current institutional set-up seems,
therefore, to restrict the quantity of workers with tertiary education creating a monopoly-
situation where returns to tertiary education increases excessively. Hence, the findings
indicate that the Brazilian market for education is not self-regulating. A reform of the
institutional framework of tertiary education appears necessary in order to assure that the
education system provides the economy with a sufficient number of workers with
advanced skills.
In Brazil, provision of tertiary education is split approximately 60/40 between private and
public providers, respectively. An major expansion in the private or / and the public
section of the tertiary education system could hence substantially increase the number of
graduates. World Bank (2000b) appraised, in collaboration with the Brazilian
government, the tertiary education system and came up with policy recommendations
aiming at:
*.  Lmproving  access. An appropriate first step in an expansion could be setting targets
for increases in access and completion. Second, addressing market failures such as
lack of credit to finance studies, would lead to increased enrollment. An important
aspect of such a loan scheme would be that it was designed to have zero or minimal
subsidies and be oriented towards poorer segments in the population.
*Improvin  qualiy  and relevance. 3 Granting increased autonomy to each institution in
order to allow the institutions to develop internal quality control and decide on
curricula  and course structure issues. This could be a decisive step towards increasing
flexibility and specialization.
*:  Improving  efficiency in public institutions. Currently the public providers of tertiary
education are plagued by low internal efficiency. Additionally, public funding of
tertiary education proves extremely poverty regressive: over three fourths of the
resources budgeted to public tertiary education pays for education to the wealthiest 20
developed  and  developing  countries.  The linkages  between  education  policy,  labor  market  earnings  and
wage  inequality  discussed  in the case  of Brazil  plausibly  pertain  to other  developing  countries  as well.
42 The full  set of strategies  and recommendations  for  higher  education  in Brazil  is presented  in Appendix  E.
43 So  far this paper  has primarily  analyzed  the education  sector  from  a quantitative  point  of view.  The
quality  aspect  of the education  system  is however  equally  important  for  generating  economic  growth.
Therefore,  it is essential  that a quantitative  expansion  of the tertiary  education  do not occur at the expense
of quality.
26percent of the population. Expansion in enrollment into public institutions should
hence be financed through resources generated from outside of the public sector or
through internal improvements in efficiency, and not by increased public funding.
7.CONCLUSION
This paper has documented that a steady expansion in attainment of education  took place
in Brazil from 1982 to 1998. A beneficial focus on universal provision of basic education
significantly  expanded the supply of workers with primary and secondary education. This
in turn reduced returns to primary and lower secondary education. Concurrently, demand
for highly skilled workers, possibly associated with structural adjustment policies, pushed
up returns to tertiary education. The development fundamentally altered the way
education was remunerated on the labor market. In particular, we find:
*  The earnings  function in Brazil became increasingly convex. From 1982 to 1998, the
returns to a completed year of tertiary schooling surged 24 percent, while returns to
primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary schooling declined 26, 35 and 8
percent, respectively. Furthermore, quantile regression shows that the change in the
earnings function affected all quantiles of the income distribution. Although, the
remuneration of schooling within each education group became more homogeneous
in the last two decades, large discrepancies  still exist. For example, the 10 percent
highest paid workers with upper secondary  education receive 74 percent higher
returns than the 10 percent lowest paid workers with upper secondary education.
*:  Wage inequality decreased as a consequence of an average decline in returns to
schooling. However, the decline was partially offset by the rise in returns to tertiary
education. Furthermore, we suggest that the primary influence of education on wage
inequality is the impact of returns to schooling and only secondarily the impact of the
distribution of schooling.  Consequently, policymakers interested in decreasing wage-
inequality should implement policies that reduce returns to schooling.
The findings strongly suggest that the current supply of workers with tertiary education in
Brazil inadequately meets demand. Furthermore, the institutional framework surrounding
the tertiary education system seems to provide institutions with little incentive to respond
to the rising needs for highly skilled labor. Therefore, policymakers might consider
adopting new regulation that induces private and public providers of tertiary education to
increase access, enrollment and completion.
A successful reform of the tertiary education system would offer a larger and broader
spectrum of existing and coming workers the opportunity to acquire the highly rewarded
advanced skills and thereby raise individual  productivity, labor market income and living
standards. On an aggregated scale, the increased availability of tertiarv educated workers
would (a) promote economic growth by increasing labor productivity and lay the
foundation for faster technological transfer, and (b) reduce the skill premium that in turn
would mitigate wage inequality. Therefore, an increased supply of highly educated
workers could in the long run prove both growth-enhancing and equitable.
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Table Al Variable list and coding  or the descriptive statistics
Variable Name  Computed as
(Vxxx refers to the variable coding in PME-questionnaires)
Monthly  wage  (fixed 1997  R$)  Nominal  monthly  wage  (sum  of V309  &  V31  1)  deflated  by IPCA*
(including  wage from second jobs, if applicable)
Hourly  wage (fixed 1997  R$)  Monthly wage  V309 + V3 11
(including wage and working hours from second  Hourly wage =  W
jobs,  if  applicable)  Workinghoursperweek*4  (V310+V312)*4
Education (highest completed level)**
Hourly wage per Tertiary  Average hourly wage for workers with Tertiary education
Hourly wage per Upper secondary  Average hourly wage for workers with Upper secondary education
Hourly wage per Lower secondary  Average hourly wage for workers with Lower secondary education
Hourly wage per Pnmary  Average hourly wage for workers with Primary education
Hourly wage per No schooling  Average hourly wage for workers without degree
Ratios of wage 
Hourly wage of Tertiary to other education levels  Average  hourly  wage  of  Tertiary  educated  workers
Average  hourly wage of comparing  group
where  the companng  groups  are Upper  secondary,  Lower  Secondary,  Pnmary,  and  No
schooling
Labor Market  Status
Hourly  wage per employee  Average hourly wage if V306=2
Hourly wage  er self-employed  Average hourly wage if V306=4
Hourly wage per employer  Average hourly wage if V306=6
Hourly wage per employee without signed  Average hourly wage if V306=2 and V308=4
workbook
Hourly wage per employee with signed workbook  Average hourly wage if V306=2 and V308=2
Sector
Hourly wage per worker in Industry  Average hourly wage if V305=1
Hourly wage  per worker in Construction  Average hourly wage if V305=3
Hourly wage  per worker in Commerce  Average hourly wage if V305=5
Hourly  wage per worker in Service  Average hourly wage if V305=7
Salary Frequency
Hourly  wage if paid monthly  Average hourly wage if V307=1
Hourly  wage if paid every two weeks  Average hourly wage if V307=3
Hourly wage if paid weekly  Average hourly wage if V307=5
Unemployment
Unemployment  rate in % of active population  (As  Number  of  unemployed
defined  by  IBGE  on  www  IBGE.gov.br)  Number of economic active
where
1)  A worker is unemployed if searching forjob  V301=4
2) A worker is economic active if bemg either employee, self-employed, employer
(V306=2,4,6)  or being unemployed (V301=4)
Unemployment  rate in % of wage earners  Number  of unemployed
Number of wage earners + Number of unemployed
Wage  variation
Standard  deviation of hourly wage  Standard deviation  of hourly wage
Years of schooling  Computed following the education structure outlined in table A3
Education stock  Percentage of the workforce who has completed the degree
(hence a tertiary graduate also counts in the Upper secondary, lowers secondary and
primav)
Read and Write  V207;1
% of sample who can read and write
Note: * The deflation is carried  out on a monthly basis, where  the reported  wage is deflated  by the
mntonthly  consumer  price index, IPCA, from the preceding  month, since wage is reported  with a lag.
** The computation  of completed education levels and completed years of schooling is presented  in
Table A3.
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Table  A.2  Variable  list  and  coding  of variables  in  the  Quantile  regression:
Variable  Name  Explanation  Computed  from
(Vxxx  refers  to codes  in PME-survey)
Age  V256
Age squared  V256*V256
Primary  Spline variable for 1-4  years of  Years  of completed schooling =1,2,3,4
(Schooling 1-4)  schooling. Corresponding to the years
in Primary
Lower Secondary  Spline variable for 5-8 years of  Years  of completed schooling =5,6,7,8
(Schooling 5-8)  schooling. Corresponding to the years
in Lower secondary
Upper Secondary  Spline variable for 9-11 years of  Years  of completed schooling =9,10,11
(Schooling 9-11)  schooling. Corresponding to the years
in Upper secondary
Tertiary  Spline variable for 12-19 years of  Years  of completed schooling =12,13,14,15,16,17
(Schooling 12-19)  schooling. Corresponding to the years
in tertiary education.
Female  =1 if female  V202=3
Fem. Primary (Schooling  Spline variable for females with 1-4  Years  of completed schooling =1,2,3,4
1-4)  years of schooling. Corresponding to  and V202=3
the years in Primary
Fem. Lower Secondary  Spline variable for females with 5-8  Years of completed schooling =5,6,7,8
(Schooling 5-8)  years of schooling. Corresponding to  and V202=3
the years in Lower secondary
Fem. Upper Secondary  Spline variable for females with 9-11  Years of completed schooling =9,10,11
(Schooling 9-11)  years of schooling. Corresponding to  and V202=3
the years in Upper secondary
Fem. Tertiary  Spline variable for females with 12-19  Years  of completed schooling =12,13,14,15,16,17 and
(Schooling 12-19)  years of schooling. Corresponding to  V202=3
the years in tertiary education.
Sector Dummy Variables
Industry  =1 if working in Industry  V305=1
Construction  =1 if working in Construction  V305=5
Service  =1 if working in Service  V305=7
Control group  Commerce
Labor market  Status
Dummy Variables
Selfemployed  =1 if Self-employed  V306, 4
Employer  =1 if Employer  V306, 6
Signed workbook  =1 if holding a signed workbook  V308=2
(only possible for Employees)
Fem. Signed workbook  =1 if female  and holds a signed  V202=3 and V308=2
workbook
(only possible for Employees)
Control group  Employees without signed workbook
Metropolitan Dummy
Variables
Salvador  =1 if from Salvador  Vio
(Bahia)
Recife  =1 if from Recife (Pernambuco)  Vio
Belo Horizonte  =1 if from Belo Horizonte  VIO
(Minas Gerais)
Porto Alegre  =1 if from Porto Alegre  VIO
(Rio Grande do Sul)
Rio de Janeiro  =I  if from Rio de Janeiro  V10
Control group  Sao Paulo  _
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Table  A.3 Computation  of completed schooling from the PME-questionnaire
Dummy  variables  for highest  completed  level  of education:
Primary  =1 if Primary(4 years of
schooling) is the highest
completed level of education.
1St  way  V210 Grade: Primary and
V211 Completed: Yes
2n'way  V210 Grade: ISt  grade and
V209 Last completed class: 4 class
3rd  way  V210 Grade: Lower secondary and
V211 Completed: No
Lower Secondary  =I if Lower secondary (8
years of schooling) is the
highest completed level of
education
st way  V210 Grade: mid 1St  cycle and
V211 Completed: Yes
2d way  V210 Grade: Ist  grade and
V209 Last completed class: 8
3r  way  V210 Grade: 2 grade and
V211 Completed: No
Upper Secondary  = I if Upper secondary (11
years of schooling) is the
highest completed level of
education
1st  way  V210 Grade: 2nd grade and
V211 Completed: Yes
2nd way  V210 Grade: Tertiary and
V211 Completed: No
Tertiary  =1 if a Tertiary (15-17 years
of schooling) education is the
highest completed level of
education
I' way  V210 Grade: Higher Education and
V211 Completed: Yes
2nd  way  V210 Grade: Master or Doctor, and
V211 Completed: No
Years of Schooling  The years of schooling is
(YoS)  computed from the above
dummies:
Completed Primary  YoS = 4  If incomplete Primary then YoS = V209 (1-4)
Completed Lower  YoS = 8  If incomplete lower secondary then
Secondary  YoS = V209 (14)  + 4 or YoS= V210 (5-8)
Completed Upper  YoS = 11  If incomplete Upper secondary then
Secondary  YoS = V209 (1-3) + 8
Completed Tertiary  YoS = 15-17  If incomplete tertiary then
_______________________  YoS = V209 (1-5) + 11
The questionnaire asks three questions concerning education. These have to be combined to compute the  highest level of
education. This computation assumes 4 levels of completed degrees: Primary (1-4 years), Lower secondary(5-8), Upper
secondary(9-1  1), and Tertiary  (12-15/17). The structure of the first three levels (and names) follows World Bank(2000a).
Respondents with the same level of completed education can answer the education questions in different ways. This ambiguity
probably reflects the need for flexibility due to the fact that the working force has attend school in different time periods (and
geographical areas) and therefore under different school systems. The above computation has been constructed on the basis of:
(1) Algorithm from Lam and Schoeni(1993) as well as Ban-os and Ramos(1996). (2) Examination  of cross tabulations of the
three questions V209, V2  10 and V211. (3) Experience from the PNAD-data (Brazilian Household Survey) which asks 3
questions on education similar to V209, V2  10 and V211, and, additional to the PME-survey,  a 4h question concerning the
number of years in school. The reported number of years of schooling corresponds with the above computation. For example, the
vast majority of people classified by the above classification as having completed lower secondary school, which, according to
the classification takes 8 years, actually reports 8 years of schooling.
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Descriptive Statistics 1982-1998  Male and Female
Year  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  % Change
1982-90
All wage are average waves in fixed 1997R$
Hourly  wage  5.37  4.83  4.30  4.24  4.94  4.26  4.26  4.44  4.12  -30%
Monthly wage  856  783  691  678  833  716  718  737  677  -30%
Hours  worked  per  week  43.3  42.9  42.6  42.5  43.4  43.2  43.1  42.0  41.6  -4%
Inequality in hourly wage
Gini  coefficient  |  0.569  0.566  0.563  0.554  0.554  0.548  0.559  0.568  0.582  2.2%
Hourly wage by education level (% of workforce with the level as the highest  level of completed  educ tion)
Tertiary  19.0(7.5%)  16.7(7.8%)  14.5(8.1%)  14.3(8.0%)  16.5(8.3%)  14.0(8.8%)  14.5(9.0%)  14.8(9.4%)  14.0(9.5%)  -36%(1.9%p*)
Upper  secondary  8.95(11.2%) 7.68(11.6%)  6.89(12.3%) 6.70(13.0%) 7.82(13.3%) 6.52(13.7%)  6.43(14.3%)  6.68(14.9%)  6.02(15.5%)  -49%(4.3%p*)
Lower  Secondary  5.33(11.9%) 4.74(12.1%)  4.10(12.4%) 4.03(12.5%)  4.69(12.8%) 3.93(12.8%)  3.78(12.8%) 3.85(13.3%)  3.43(13.2%)  -55%(1.3%p)
Primary  3.43(32.7%) 3.03(33.0%)  2.61(32.9%) 2.62(32.7%)  3.13(33.4%) 2.67(33.4%) 2.53(33.8%)  2.60(33.7%)  2.41(34.2%)  -430/(1.5%p)
No Schooling  2.17(36.7%)  1.95(35.5%)  1.70(34.4%) 1.69(33.7%) 2.05(32.3%)  1.82(31.3%)  1.71(30.1%) 1.82(28.7%)  1.63(27.7%)  -33%(-9.0%p)
Inequality in Education
Gini  coefficient  |  0.440  0.435  0.431  0.425  0.419  0.415  0.410  0.404  0.398  -9.4%
(for years of schooling)  I
Ratio of hourly wages between education levels  ..
Ratio of hourly wage of a worker with tertiary education  to the wage of a worker with:
Upper  secondary  212%  217%  211%  214%  211%  215%  225%  222%  232%  9%
education
Lower  Secondary  edu.  356%  352%  354%  356%  351%  356%  383%  386%  407%  13%
Primary  edu.  553%  551%  557%  548%  526%  524%  572%  571%  580%  5%
No schooling  873%  857%  855%  851%  805%  772%  846%  816%  856%  -2%
Ratio of hourly wage of  a worker with U  per secondary education  to a worker with:
Lower  Secondary  edu.  168%  162%  168%  166%  167%  166%  170%  174%  175%  4%
Primary  edu.  261%  254%  264%  256%  250%  244%  254%  257%  250%  -4%
No schooling  411%  395%  405%  398%  382%  359%  376%  367%  369%  -12%
Ratio  of Lower  Sec.  to  155%  156%  157%  154%  150%  147%  149%  148%  143%  -79%
Primary  _  _  _  _  _
Ratio  of Elemetary  to  158%  156%  153%  155%  153%  147%  148%  143%  147%  -7%
No Schooling  I  _  I  I
Hourly wage by Sector  (%  of workforce employed in the sector)
Industry  5.93(23.9%)  . 5.42(23.2%)  . 4.90(23.2%) 4.75(22.9%)  5.45(24.8%) 4.75(24.5%) 4.88(24.1%)  5.00(24.0%)  4.54(23.1%)  -31%  (-0.8%p)
Construction  3.21(13.4%)  |  3.02(12.1%)  |  2.64(10.9%) 2.58(10.7%)  3.15(10.5%) 2.83(10.3%) 2.72(10.6%)  2.91(10.6%)  2.72(10.9%)  -18%(-2.5%p)
Commerce  4.30(12.5%)  . 3.67(13.0%) 3.41(13.1%) 3.38(13.1%) 4.30(12.7%) 3.61(12.7%)  3.46(13.1%)  3.72(13.4%)  3.56(13.7%)  -21%  (.1%p)
Service  5.77(40.2%)  5.20(41.3%)  . 4.57(41.9%) 4.52(42.1%)  5.12(41.6%) 4.38(42.3%)  4.45(42.2%)  4.65(42.5%)  4.29(43.0%)  -34%  (2.7%p)
Note: * For variables denoted in percentages,  the change from one year to another year is given in percentage points, %/op,.  The percentage point is simply
calculated by subtracting  the percentage value in the end of the period from the percentage in the start. Hence for the share of workers with Upper secondary
education,  the change  from  1982  to 1990  is computed  as: 4.3%p=  15.5%  -11.2%.Appendix B
Year  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  %Change  %Change
9999_  _  l_  1991-98  1982-98
All wage are average wages in fixed 1997R$
Hourly wage  3.27  2.99  3.28  3.62  4.29  4.64  4.78  4.84  48%  -10%
Monthly wage  540  493  543  605  718  780  800  797  48%  -7%
Hours worked per week  41.6  41.9  41.9  42.1  42.3  42.5  42.5  41.9  1%-3%
Inequality of hourly wage
Gini coefficient  0.553  0.547  0.553  0.578  0.561  0.550  0.551  0.560  1.3%  -1.5%
Hourly wage by education level (% of  workforce  with the level as the highest  level of completed  education)
Tertiary  10.7(9.6%)  9.6(9.5%)  9.6%(9.8%)  9.5%(9.4%)  14.8(9.7%)  15.1(10.1%)  15.1(10.4%)  15.8(10.3%)  47%(0.8%p*)  -17%(2.8%p)
Upper secondary  4.63(15.9%)  4.26(15.9%)  4.67(16.4%)  5.32(16.4%)  6.12(16.7%)  6.29(17.5%)  6.29(18.3%)  6.31(18.8%)  36%(3.3%p)  -29%(7.5%p)
Lower Secondary  2.71(13.1%/.)  2.49(13.4%/o) 2.73(13.7%/o) 2.95(14.1%)  3.53(14.2%)  3.67(14.2%)  3.68(14.4%)  3.60(15.1  %/o)  33%(1.9%/op)  -33%(3.2%p)
Primary  1.93(34.1%/o) 1.77(34.4%)  1.91(34.4%)  2.07(35.2%)  2.46(35.2%)  2.63(35.2%)  2.65(34.7%)  2.56(34.3%)  32%(0.1%P)  -26%(1.6%p)
No Schooling  1.39(27.3%)  1.28(26.8%)  1.37(25.8%)  1.48(24.9%)  1.80(24.2%)  1.94(23.1%)  1.96(22.2%)  1.94(21.5%)  40%(-6.2%p)  -11%(-15.2%p)
Inequality in Education  I_I  __
Gini coefficient  0.396  0.394  0.389  0.382  0.379  0.372  0.367  0.361  -8.9%  -17.9%
(for years  of schooling)  I
Ratio of hourly wages between education levels  _
Ratio of hourly wage of a  worker with tertiary education  to the wage of a worker with:
Upper secondary  232%  226%  228%  242%  241%  240%  239%  250%  8%  18%
education
Lower Secondary edu.  396%  386%  390%  436%  418%  411%  409%  439%  11%  23%
Primary edu.  555%  543%  557%  623%  600%  574%  569%  617%  11%  11%
No schooling  775%  754%  779%  867%  821%  777%  768%  812%  5%  -7%
Ratio of hourly wage of a worker with U per secondary education  to a worker with:
Lower Secondary edu.  171%  171%  171%  180%  173%  171%  171%  176%  3%  5%
Primary edu.  239%  240%  244%  258%  249%  240%  238%  247%  3%  -5%
No schooling  334%  333%  342%  359%  341%  324%  321%  325%  -3%  -21%
Ratio of Lower Sec. to  140%  140%  143%  143%  144%  140%  139%  141%  0%  -10%
Primary
Ratio of Elemetary  to  140%  139%  140%  139%  137%  135%  135%  132%  -6%  -17%
No Schooling  I  _I
Hourly wage by Sector  (%  of workforce employed in the  sector)
Industry  3.63(21.7%)  3.56(20.5%)  3.91(20.1%)  4.18(20.0%)  4.78(19.5%)  5.18(18.3%)  5.20(17.8%)  5.22(17.4%)  44%(-5.7%p)  -12%(-6.5%p)
Construction  2.30(10.9%)  2.06(10.9%)  2.20(10.4%)  2.26(10.8%)  2.86(10.5%)  3.12(10.8%)  3.23(10.6%)  3.08(10.6%)  34%(-0.4%/op)  -4%(-2.8%p)
Commerce  2.79(13.8%  2.43(14.0%)  2.65(14.1%)  3.11(14.2%)  3.67(14.1%)  4.01(14.2%)  4.07(14.1%)  4.11(14.1%)  47%(0.4%p)  -4%(0.6%p)
Service  3.40(44.2%)  3.10(44.8%)  3.41(45.6%)  3.85(45.3%)  4.54(46.5%)  4.92(47.5%)  5.13(48.3%)  5.17(49.10%)  52%(6.1p)  - o%(8.9%p)
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Year  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  %Change
______  _____  1982-90
Hourly  wage  by Labor  Market Status  (% of workforce  with the status)
Employee  5.46(74.1%)  4.97(73.4%)  4.41(72.9%)  4.36(73.3%)  4.80(73.8%)  4.19(72.9%)  4.29(72.4%)  4.35(72.0%)  4.01(71.0%)  -36% (-3. 1%p)
Selfemployed  3.30(18.7%)  2.87(19.6%)  2.55(20.4%)  2.58(20.2%)  3.56(19.7%)  3.05(20.5%)  2.79(20.9%)  3.06(21.2%)  2.86(22.1%)  -15% (3.4%/oP)
Employer  9.73(6.9%)  8.67(6.9%)  8.34(6.6%)  8.03(6.4%)  11.05(6.4%)  9.08(6.5%)  8.82(6.5%)  10.17(6.7%)  9.95(6.8%)  2% (-0.2%p)
For  Employees
with signed workbook  5.50(78.7%)  5.05(77.8%)  4.53(77.1%)  4.43(77.9%)  4.83(79.5%)  4.22(79.4%)  4.36(79.8%)  4.45(80.5%)  4.04(80.0%)  -36% (1.2%p)
without signed  5.31(21.3%)  4.64(22.2%)  3.99(22.9%)  4.16(22.1%)  4.70(20.5%)  4.06(20.6%)  4.02(20.2%)  3.97(19.5%)  3.86(20.0%)  -37% (-1.2%p)
workbook
Wage ratio  for  104%  109%  114%  106%  103%  104%  108%  112%  105%  1%
employees with signed
workbook to unsigned
Wage ratio for  166%  173%  173%  169%  135%  137%  154%  142%  140%  -18%
employees to selfemp
Hourly  wage  by Salary  Frequency  wa  e  (% of workforce  paid by the frequency)
Wage if paid monthly  6.73(66.0%)  5.95(68.8%)  5.20(70.8%)  5.11(71.8%)  5.51(73.2%)  4.79(75.4%)  4.96(75.5%)  4.98(76.3%)  4.64(72.9%)  -45% (7.0%p)
Wage if paid per two  4.22(6.5%)  3.76(5.2%)  3.18(5.2%)  3.02(5.2%)  3.39(5.3%)  2.93(7.2%)  3.13(9.5%)  3.15(10.5%)  3.00(14.0%)  -41% (7.5%p)
weeks
Wage if paid weekly  2.16(16.8%)  1,95(14.5%)  1.62(13.0%)  1.64(13.0%)  1.88(11.7%)  1.67(12.4%)  1.61(13.5%)  1.64(11.7%)  1.53(11.7%)  -41% (-5.1  %p)
Unemployment
In % of Active  2.6%  3.6%  3.8%  2.6%  1.7%  1.9%  2.0%  1.8%  2.5%  -1%
population  .282_1232_92
In % of Wage earners  2.8%  4.1%  4.3%  2.8%  2.0%  2.1%  2.3%  2.1%  2.9%  2%
In % of Wage earners  by education level
Tertia  1.0%  1  .4%  1.2%  0.8%  0.8%  1.0%  0.9%  0.8%  1.3%  26%
Upper secondary  1.9%  2.6%  2.5%  1.9%  1.7%  2.1%  2.1%  2.0%  2.6%  27%
Lower secondary  2.5%  3.6%  3.9%  2.6%  2.3%  2.4%  2.8%  2.4%  3.6%  29%
Primary  3.3%  4.6%  5.1%  3.4%  2.3%  2.4%  2.7%  2.5%  3.3%  1%
No schooling  3.4%  1  5.1%  5.4%  3.4%  1.9%  2.1%  2.0%  1.9%  2.7%  -23%
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Year  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Change  Change
I  I  l  l  1991-98  1982-98
Hourly wage by Labor Market  Status (% of workforce with the status)
Employee  3.23(69.1  %)  3.07(68.0%)  3.34(67.9%)  3.55(67.8%)  4.05(66.8%)  4.40(65.3%)  4.49(65.0%)  4.55(65.4%)  41%(-5.6%)  1 7%(-8.7%p)
Selfemployed  2.32(24.1%)  2.00(25.3%)  2.22(25.4%)  2.63(26.0%)  3.39(26.7%)  3.69(27.9%)  3.95(28.5%)  3.82(27.8%)  650/o(5.7%)  16%(9.1%p)
Employer  7.43(6.7%)  6.22(6.6%)  7.21(6.5%)  9.69(6.1%)  12.04(6.4%)  11.90(6.6%)  11.85(6.5%)  12.53(6.7%)  69%(-0.1%)  29%(-0.3%p)
For Employees
with signed workbook  3.26(77.3%)  3.16(75.5%)  3.45(74.3%)  3.64(73.3%)  4.03(72.4%)  4.39(71.0%)  4.50(70.5%)  4.52(70.0%)  39%(-9.9%)  -18%(-8.7%p)
without signed  3.15(22.7%)  2.76(24.5%)  3.03(25.7%)  3.28(26.7%)  4.13(27.6%)  4.43(29.0%)  4.48(29.5%)  4.63(30.0%)  47%(9.9%)  -13%(8.7%p)
workbook
Wage ratio for  103%  114%  114%  111%  98%  99%  101%  97%  -6%  -6%
employees with signed
workbook to unsigned
Wage ratio for  139%  153%  150%  135%  120%  119%  114%  119%  -14%  -28%
employees to selfemp
Hourly wage by Salary Frequency  wa e (% of workforce paid by the frequency)
Wage if paid monthly  3.69(71.1%)  3.43(72.4%)  3.73(72.7%)  3.96(71.1%)  4.47(72.6%)  4.81(72.9%)  4.93(74.0%)  5.01(75.6%)  36%(2.7%P)  -26%(9.6%p)
Wage if paid per two  2.76(15.7%)  2.83(15.0%)  3.05(15.4%)  3.25(17.4%)  3.68(16.6%)  3.97(16.9%)  3.89(16.4%)  3.73(15.2%)  35%(1.2%p)  -12%(8.7%p)
weeks
Wage if paid weekly  1.29(11.6%)  1  .20(10.9%)  1.28(10.1%)  1.37(9.7%)  1.75(9.1%)  2.01(8.3%)  1.96(7.6%)  1.93(7.0%)  49%(4 .6 0iop)  - 1 %(-9.7%p)
Unemployment***
In % of Active  2.8%  3.4%  3.2%  3.1%  2.9%  3.1%  3.4%  4.8%  69%  86%
population
In % of Wage earners  3.2%  4.0%  3.8%  3.8%  3.5%  3.6%  4.0%  5.6%  72%  96%
In % of wage earners by education level
Tertiary  1.5%  1.5%  1.7%  1.5%  1.5%  1.9%  1  .7%  2.7%  76%  171%
Upper secondary  3.1%  3.6%  3.4%  3.5%  3.3%  3.5%  3.7%  4.9%  61%  160%
Lower secondary  3.9%  4.5%  4.2%  4.6%  3.9%  4.1%  4.6%  5.9%  54%  136%
Primary  3.7%  4.7%  4.5%  4.3%  4.0%  4.1%  4.6%  6.5%  75%  98%
No schooling  2.9%  3.8%  3.7%  3.4%  3.2%  3.5%  3.8%  5.6%  92%  66%
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Year  1982  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  9Change
l1  1982-90
Standard  deviation  of hourly  wage  (measure  of uncertainty)
Whole sample  11.4  9.1  7.0  6.9  8.6  7.1  7.1  8.3  8.1  -41%
per education level
Tertiary  19.0  16.4  13.2  13.1  16.8  14.6  14.4  15.2  15.9  -20%
Upper secondary  14.4  10.1  9.0  6.9  10.0  7.6  7.8  9.3  8.6  -67%
Lower secondary  9.7  8.0  5.6  6.8  6.7  5.4  4.7  5.3  4.4  -121%
Primary  9.5  6.2  3.2  4.0  5.0  3.3  3.1  4.9  5.5  -72%
No schooling  5.4  4.9  2.3  2.1  2.4  2.3  2.1  4.6  2.7  -105%
Years of schooling  5.39  5.49  5.59  5.67  5.76  5.87  5.96  6.10  6.19  13%
Stock  of Education**
Tertiary  7.5%  7.8%  8.1%  8.0%  8.3%  8.8%  9.0%  9.4%  9.5%  20%
Upper secondary  18.7%  19.4%  20.4%  21.0%  21.6%  22.5%  23.3%  24.3%  25.0%  25%
Lower secondary  30.6%  31.5%  32.7%  33.5%  34.3%  35.3%  36.1%  37.6%  38.1%  20%
Primary  63.3%  64.5%  65.6%  66.3%  67.7%  68.7%  69.9%  71.3%  72.3%  12%
% who can read and  86.1%  86.5%  87.0%  87.1%  87.9%  88.2%  88.2%  88.6%  89.0%  3%
write  I  I  I
Median  hourly  wage  in fixed  1997 R_
Hourly wage  2.62  2.36  2.15  2.15  2.65  2.35  2.23  2.27  2.06  -27%
Monthly wage  477  428  387  385  470  416  392  393  358  -33%
Per education level
Tertiary  15.0  12.8  11.1  11.3  12.4  10.3  10.6  10.4  10.1  -49%
Upper secondary  6.18  5.47  4.83  4.90  5.49  4.63  4.48  4.53  4.00  -54%
Lower Secondary  3.58  3.16  2.78  2.75  3.28  2.80  2.67  2.64  2.38  -51%
EleTnentary  2.34  2.09  1.85  1.83  2.25  1.98  1.86  1.87  1.68  -40%
No schooling  1.59  1.41  1.24  1.24  1.51  1.36  1.30  1.30  1.16  -37%
Sample information
Female % of workforce  18.8%  20.0%  19.8%  20.7%  20.4%  21.4%  20.9%  21.6%  21.7%  14%
Number of observations  334513  425224  439601  407157  441835  441916  402520  346037  353419  5%
Average age of  43.2  43.7  43.7  44.2  44.3  44.9  44.5  44.5  44.5  3%
workforce
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Year  19119  931994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Change  Change
_____  _______  1  ________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1991-98  1982-98
Standard deviation  ofhu]wgmeasure  of unceraityp____
Whole  sample  88  _  78  98  1  15  114  115  124  198  123%  1%
Per education level
Tertiary  179  ~~~~~~~~~  ~~160  198  - 256  23  1  3  8  90-17%
Uppereco~ndary  982  1  0536_  119  1i28  137  34  252%"  36%
Lower secondary  53  578  8  69  64  68  63  19%/  -61%/
P~riary  3 7  2 9  44  ____45  __4947  26%  -69%
No schooin  25  23  25  29  ~  32  33  35  30  19%  -66%
Years of!_chooling  - .46.23  __  6.35  6.35  ~6.44  6.57  6.70  -~6.80  -9%  - 26%
Stock  of Education**  _____________
TLertiary  9.6%  9.5%  98%-/  9.4%/-  9.7%  10.1%  10.4%  10.3%  7%-.  37%
Upper secondary  25.5%  25.4%  2  6.2%  25. 8%  26.  4%  27.6%  28.7%  29.1%  14%  55%
Lower secondary  38.7%  38.8%  39.8%  39.9%  40.7%  41.8%  43.1%  44.2%  14%  44%
Primary  72.7%  73.2%  42%75.10%  75.8%  76.9%  77.8%/  78.5%  8  %  24%
% who can read and  89.1%  89.0%  89.4%.  89.8%  90.1%  90.7%  91.0%  91.3%  2%  6%
write
MVedian  hourly  wage  in fxed  1997 R$  ___  ____
Hourly wge  - 302  -- 280  302  308  1  383  424  430  436  45%  -8%
_Monthly  wage  1.73  1.T62-  1.74  1.81  j  2.24  2.47  2.54  2.48  43%  -5%
per education  levelI
Tertiary  7.  . . .7  11.31.1.822  57%  -19%
Upper secondary  3.16  2.91  3.16  3.43  4.09  4.22  4.25  4.18  32%  -32%
Lower Secondary  1.93  1.78  1.92  1.98  2.47  2.64  2.61  2.55  32%  -29%
Elelmentary  1.42  1.33  1.42  1.43  1.79  1.94  1.96  1.86  31%  -21%/
No schooling  1.03  0.97  1.03  1.06  1.34  1.43  1.49  1.47  42%  -8%
Sample  information  ___________
Female % of workforce  23.0%  22.7%  23.8%  23.2%  24.4%  24.3%  25.6%  26.2%  14%  39%
Number of observations  355856  336738  341399  351974  356403  356031  364001  183722  -48%  -45%
Average age of  45.0  4554.  5.4  45.9  46.2  46.6  46.6  4%  8%
workforce__  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Note: * For variables denoted in percentages,  the change from one year to another year is given in percentage points, %p,. The percentage point is simply
calculated by subtracting  the percentage value in the end  of the period from the percentage in the start. Hence for the share of workers with Upper secondary
education, the change from 1982 to 1990 is computed as : 4.3%p= 15.5% -11.2%.
**Stock of education: Percentage of workforce graduated from each level of education. A wvorker  with tertiary education also figures in the statistics for  Upper
secondary and lower levels, since the worker has graduated from these levels as well. This statistic hence differs from the statistics on highest completed level of
education reported in the top of the table.
**The  unemployment figures are calculated on the basis of the definition outlined on the web sites of the Brazilian Statistical Bureau (IBGE),
www.ibge.Rov.b . The reported figures are likely to underestimated  the actual level of unemployment.
39Appendix C Regression Results
Regression results for alternative schooling specification,
Model (1) linear schooling specification and
R2 for spline specification with schooling variables only.
Linear model  Spline  model with
Schooling
variables ONLY
2~~~~~~~~~~ Year  P(schooling)  t-value  RR
1982  13.87%  412.5  0.519  0.425
1983  13.63%  444.2  0.513  0.414
1984  13.69%  445.1  0.518  0.409
1985  13.72%  413.2  0.503  0.402
1986  13.67%  457.4  0.518  0.411
1987  13.28%  443.0  0.503  0.397
1988  13.39%  432.4  0.516  0.413
1989  13.39%  384.8  0.501  0.400
1990  13.68%  378.6  0.492  0.390
1991  12.62%  375.5  0.489  0.391
1992  12.44%  345.2  0.478  0.375
1993  12.56%  338.9  0.480  0.372
1994  13.00%  337.8  0.483  0.367
1995  12.82%  351.6  0.504  0.381
1996  12.67%  361.7  0.508  0.392
1997  12.61%  359.6  0.503  0.390
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Strategies and Recommendations  for Higher Education  in Brazil'
Brazil has given considerable  thought to the development and reform of its tertiary
education system and has made  significant progress in  many important areas. This
section of the report suggests further developments to progress already made by Brazil
focusing on the strategic  goals of access, quality, relevance and efficiency.
1. Improving  Access
In the area of  improved access, it is suggested that the government consider the
following:
*  Brazil has taken major steps to diversify  the types of tertiary institutions and the
delivery methods used as a means of improving access and enrollment.  These
include the  promotion  of  university centers, the  development of  sequential
courses, the offering of night classes, and the more recent development of remote
teaching.. In order to continue to promote these means of tertiary education the
Government may find  it useful to set timed targets as a way of monitoring and
measuring the progress of each of these interventions in increasing access and
enrollments.
*  Providing  further financial assistance to poorer students to enable them to afford
the  fees at private institutions as well as to offset some of the costs associated  with
attending  public institutions might also serve to improve access and enrollment.
The uneven distribution of  tertiary enrollments by income group means that
highly targeted aid could have a major impact on who attends.  In developing a
student aid program/policy, it will be important to identify which segment(s) of
the student population would be eligible for assistance and, based on enrollment
targets, estimate the total  amount of assistance which might be needed.  An
important  aspect of any loan scheme would be that it was designed  to have zero or
minimal subsidies, coupled with a mix of institutionally based discounts and
scholarships. This would generate an expansion in enrollments,  targeting of those
most in need, and make minimal demands on the government coffers.
*  Currently,  coverage is about ten percent, significantly lower than other countries
comparable to Brazil in size and dynamism.  While the Government wishes to
improve this, at present, there is no specific target or time frame for the increase.
The Government may want to set a broad enrollment target  for  2005 and 2010.
According to the  estimates made  earlier in  the report (see Table  11), if  the
Government set a  gross enrollment rate of  15 percent for the year 2005; that
would mean providing places for an additional 800,000 students.  This does not
seem unreasonable  if one considers the large increase in the number of secondary
school graduates anticipated.  Nor  would such  an  increase require  a  major
increase in public expenditure, if efficiency gains are made in the public sector
and the private sector continues to grow in response to demand.
Strategies and Recommendations  included in the Brazil: Higher Education Sector Study (WB Report #  19392-BR,
June 30, 2000, L. Holm-Nielsen  et all.).
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2. Improving  Quality
The Government has taken major steps to improve the quality of tertiary education
consisting of an exit exam, the Provao, site visits, and data collection by the INEP.  To
further  develop a culture of quality in tertiary education:
*  It will be important  to ensure that the Provdo remains aflexible tool that changes
with curricula developments rather than serve as a rigid guide to set curricula.
It is also important to maintain the expansion of PAU1B  activities and the data
collection by  INEP in  order to assure quality controls are in place to  ensure
institutions remain responsible  while gaining various degrees  of autonomy.
*  Institutions will need to be actively encouraged  to develop more rigorous internal
quality assurance mechanisms  for themselves. One way to accomplish  this would
be  for the  Govermment  to  develop a  type of  audit of  quality to  review the
effectiveness  if  the  internal  quality  processes  of  an  institution  which,  if
satisfactory, would mean more relaxed quality assessment by  government, a
signal to institutions that they were performing the task of assessment well.
3. Improving  Relevance
It has always been a concern of countries that its tertiary system serve the needs of
society and the economy.
*  Brazil has taken a step in this direction  by modifying its legal framework  to allow
greater  flexibility in curriculum content.  It is also important to seek information
from employers on the skills and knowledge mix they need and to encourage
them to participate in curriculum  design.
*  Flexibility is needed in course structure as well, for example, the major/minor
concept used in the US in which students exercise some guided choice over the
modules they study.  This approach may have to be actively developed with the
institutions  since  it  does  not  fit  with  the  academic  tradition  of  Brazilian
universities.
*  Institutions should try to identify both national and regional/local needs which
they think they are able to meet or have a comparative advantage in over other
institutions, and offer appropriate study programs . Each institution has any
number of stakeholders  - the local labor market which it serves, the stuideiits  who
apply and attend, and the local or regional development needs which can be
identified through outreach to community and regional organizations.  Once the
needs of the various groups have been identified, institutions should respond to
them by prioritizing them and providing  courses and programs that meet the
demand. When institutions become more "consumer oriented" there is the bonus
of greater diversification  in the system.
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4. Improving  Efficiency
Given Brazil's  need to  expand the system coupled with ever diminishing public
resources, improvements  in efficiency in the public sector is imperative.
*  The clearest inefficiency in the public tertiary system is the current civil service
structure as it pertains to the hiring, firing, promotion, and reward structure of
faculty,  technical and  administrative personnel.  Brazil  will  need to  think
carefully about reform measures if it wants to make operational, in a meaningful
way, the principles set forth in the new legal framework.
*  The new legal framework developed and adopted by the Government, indicates
that Brazil is moving away from direct control of public tertiary education and is
moving toward providing an enabling policy environment for institutions.  For
institutional autonomy of this type to be meaningful,  the Government  may want to
consider  implementing  the  following  guidelines  which  are  considered
international  goodpractice:
a)  provide public funds in the form of Block Grants allowing institutions to
determine exact allocations;
b)  permit institutions to keep any revenue they generate without a reduction
in the total amount of govenment funding;
c)  require  accountability of  institutions receiving public  funds  through:
requiring institutions to produce a five year strategic plan and a one year
operational plan  (based  on  the  Governments overall  national  goals);
require  monitoring  of  the  institutional plan;  require  participation in
accreditation/re-accreditation  processes, providing annual budgets that are
transparent, and  producing detailed annual reports  of  what  has  been
achieved with the funds.
* There is scope in the system to increase efficiency in the use of the academic staff
in public  institutions, to increase the use of physical infrastructure through more
intensive use, not only over the course of a day, but throughout the year, and to
reduce  drop  out  and failure  rates  through  improved teaching  and  increased
relevance.
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